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Abstract: Despite significant progress in recent years, the evolution of com-
mons over the long run remains an under-explored area. During the last years an 
international team of historians has worked under the umbrella of the Common 
Rules Project in order to design and test a new methodology aimed at advancing 
our knowledge on the dynamics of institutions for collective action – in particular 
commons. This project aims to contribute to the current debates in three different 
fronts. Theoretically, it explicitly draws the attention to change and adaptation in 
the commons – contrasting with more static analyses. Empirically, it highlights 
the value of historical records as a rich source of information for longitudinal 
analysis of the functioning of commons. Methodologically, it develops a system-
atic way of analyzing and comparing commons’ regulations across regions and 
530 Tine de Moor et al.
time, setting a number of variables that have been defined on the basis of the 
“most common denominators” in commons’ regulations across countries and time 
periods. In this paper we introduce the project, describe our sources and method-
ology, and present the preliminary results of our analysis.
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1. Introduction
Twenty-five years since the publication of Governing the Commons, the funda-
mental insights of Elinor Ostrom still retain much of the originality they exhibited 
when first published in 1990 (Ostrom 1990, 1992). Overtly challenging well-
established literature in the realm of the social sciences (Gordon 1954; Olson 
1965; Hardin 1968), her basic message was to assert the possibility of robust 
human cooperation. According to her, self-governance, with community involve-
ment and the tailoring of rules to local conditions, lies at the heart of successful 
cooperation and resource management – a revolutionary statement in the midst of 
the ‘institutional panaceas’ that dominated policy making during the 1980s and 
1990s (Ostrom 2010). Subsequent research has confirmed Ostrom’s basic intu-
itions (Cox et al. 2010) – as the award of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics pub-
licly acknowledged for the wider academic community and the general public.
Following the path pioneered by Ostrom, much of the work on the collec-
tive management of natural resources has often relied on the close analysis of a 
number of more or less contemporary case studies in different parts of the world 
(Poteete et al. 2010). In recent years, field and lab experiments have also become 
a fundamental component of the commons scholar’s toolbox, as well as agent-
based modeling and computer simulations (Janssen et al. 2011, 2015). As a con-
sequence of the increasing amount of literature, our knowledge on which are the 
main explanatory factors behind robust cooperation has greatly expanded. The 
very basic outline of this literature is evident: commons’ performance (however 
measured) becomes the variable to explain, with a number of internal and external 
factors (rules and institutions among them) being treated as exogenous explana-
tory variables.
However, questions on the emergence and change in these collective arrange-
ments have not received much attention. If problems of resource over-exploitation 
(or free-riding more generally) represent the first-order social dilemma faced by 
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commoners, the design, enforcement and modification of commons (or coor-
dination mechanisms more generally) represent the second-order and equally 
important one (Dawes 1980, Kollock 1998). How and why did these arrange-
ments emerge? How and why did they change over time? Which rules changed 
over time in reaction to which internal and external factors? If the resource stock 
diminishes, do commoners then adapt the appropriation rules? And what happens 
if the group of commoners increases: are membership conditions made stricter or 
is the resource allocation adjusted? As historians, our approach is certainly differ-
ent to much of the previous literature: we take institutions as the main dependent 
variable, and try to account for change in them by looking at a number of factors. 
In other words, we “endogeneize” institutions rather than simply taking them as 
exogenous forces.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a novel methodology aimed at dealing 
with questions about long-term change of commons as institutions for collective 
action by means of systematically collecting, classifying and comparing com-
mons’ historical regulations. During the last 5 years an international team of his-
torians from the universities of Lancaster (UK), Pública de Navarra (Spain) and 
Utrecht (The Netherlands) has worked together under the umbrella of the Project 
‘Common Rules. The regulation of institutions for managing commons in Europe, 
1100–1800’ in order to first design and subsequently implement this  methodology.1 
This project gets its original inspiration from three different fronts – a theoretical, 
an empirical and a methodological one. In contrast with most studies on com-
mons, our research questions are directly and explicitly related to the dynamics 
of commons rather than to a static analysis of their institutional features. On the 
empirical side, our work brings to the fore the value of historical regulations as a 
source of information on commons and other types of institutions for collective 
action. Finally, regarding methodology, a great deal of our efforts has focused on 
designing a systematic way of classifying these commons’ regulations and mak-
ing comparisons across regions and time. Our codebook (included as an Appendix 
to this article) and our online dataset embody the outcomes of much of the discus-
sions our team had during the years of the project.2
2. Debates
The effort of collecting, classifying and comparing the regulations produced over 
time by commons across pre-industrial Europe lies at the intersection of a number 
of debates in the fields of institutional analysis and economic history. First and 
foremost, the Common Rules project aims to contribute to discussions of institu-
tional change – particularly in collective action institutions. As we have indicated, 
1 For more information, see the project website: http://www.collective-action.info/_pro_nwo_ 
commonrules_main.
2 The database of our project is publicly available at: www.collective-action.info/commons/login.
php (previous request to the authors of the view-mode password).
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much of the literature over the past years has been mainly focused on explain-
ing the determinants of long-standing cooperation and robust common-property 
regimes by resorting to a diversity of methodological approaches (Axelrod 1984; 
Ostrom 1990; Henrich et al. 2004; Nowak and Highfield 2011). Despite valuable 
progress in this front, we still lack enough insight into how such drivers (institu-
tions and rules among them) evolved over time. Admittedly, a number of works 
have explicitly dealt with institutional change in the commons (Ensminger 1996; 
Haller 2010). Even Ostrom herself devoted a chapter in her 1990 book to analyse 
how some of the institutional arrangements she studied had emerged and changed 
over time. In our opinion, however, most of these studies have oscillated between 
being either theoretical exercises or more descriptive works – a common feature 
with those works dealing with institutional change more in general (North 1990; 
Alston et al. 1996; Greif 2006). Also importantly, when describing the process 
of rule creation and change, scholars have usually focused on relatively short 
time horizons – a situation largely explained by the unavailability of empiri-
cal evidence. The need of both a more systematic study of institutional change 
and an explicit attention to longer time horizons is evident. The main goal of the 
Common Rules project is precisely to advance in that direction. First, it provides a 
great deal of new historical evidence about the process of rule change in commons 
across Europe. But, perhaps more importantly, the project develops a methodol-
ogy which facilitates institutional analysis and makes possible comparisons both 
across communities and over time.
Beyond this immediate goal, our project is also informed by ongoing discus-
sions in the field of economic history. Since the publication of the seminal work by 
Douglass North, the right balance between individual property rights and a strong 
state in long-term development has become a favorite topic among economic his-
torians (North and Thomas 1973; North 1990; Acemoglu et al. 2005; Greif 2006; 
Ogilvie and Carus 2014). In opposition to this market-state dichotomy, in recent 
years several scholars have highlighted the role that self-governed communities 
could have played in the institutional development of Europe (Greif 2006; De 
Moor 2008; Van Zanden 2009). From their perspective, local communities would 
have been a particularly important device for coordinating and protecting prop-
erty rights during pre-industrial times – in a time when a powerful – enough state 
was simply not yet there. Merchant and craft guilds (Epstein 1998; Greif 2006; De 
Moor 2008), communes and other local self-governed institutions (Van Zanden 
and Prak 2006; Stasavage 2014) or commons (Casari 2007; De Moor 2009) are 
the main subjects of these recent studies. The claims have gone so far as to suggest 
that a high density of such communities in all realms of social and economic life 
would have been a distinctive feature of western Europe when compared to other 
regions of the world (China, Japan, the Islamic world) (Putnam 1993; De Moor 
2008; Van Zanden 2009). By studying how commoners were able to organize and 
regulate cooperation in the exploitation of natural resources during pre-industrial 
times, our project also sheds light on what was arguably a distinctive institutional 
feature of Western Europe before 1800.
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Traditionally, the study of commons by historians has been dominated by 
a concern about the consequences that the collective exploitation of resources 
had in the social and economic realms – this is the third and final debate our 
project critically engages with. Although the consensus among historians held 
that commons had been harmful for economic efficiency (a finding in line with 
much of the work of classical economists), a number of studies started to reas-
sess this view – suggesting that the longevity of such collective arrangements 
could respond to reasons other than purely distributional ones (McCloskey 1972; 
Grantham 1980; Allen 1982; Lana 2008). Despite these more positive views, the 
focus, however, still remained on the consequences of abolition of commons. 
Only with the reassessment that collective action theory witnessed from the 
1980s (Axelrod 1984; Ostrom 1990; Runge 1992), have hints of a more com-
prehensive approach to historical commons started to become visible. As a con-
sequence of this gradual shift, questions such as what the driving forces were 
behind the expansion of commons in western Europe from the late medieval 
period onwards, how communities were able to maintain these collective orga-
nizations, or which adjustments and changes they witnessed throughout time are 
becoming increasingly attractive for economic, agrarian and environmental his-
torians. To this date, however, the number of works addressing these questions 
has remained relatively small (Van Zanden 1999; De Moor et al. 2002; Casari 
2007; De Moor 2009; Rodgers et al. 2011; Laborda and De Moor 2013; De Moor 
2015; Grüne et al. 2015). With our project, our aim has been to push these recent 
efforts among historians forward –  initiating a line of research which systemati-
cally sheds light on the internal workings of what until recent times has largely 
remained the ‘black box’ of historical commons.
3. Clarifications and Assumptions
Before describing the sources and methodology, a word of caution is necessary on 
the premises upon which our work builds. The notion of ‘institutions’ used in this 
article brings together the definitions of Douglass North (‘the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’, North 1990, 3) and Elinor Ostrom (‘the 
prescription that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured 
interactions’, Ostrom 2005, 3). We are well aware that within the social sciences 
the concept of ‘institutions’ is not straightforward. In recent years definitions have 
proliferated and we are somehow required to choose among competing candidates 
(North 1990; Ostrom 2005; Greif 2006; Hodgson 2006; Kingston and Caballero 
2009).3 In this article, we therefore understand institutions as rules. Ostrom, in 
3 Such a rule-based definition of institution contrasts markedly with the equilibrium view posited 
by authors such as Masahiko Aoiki (2001) or Avner Greif (2006) – for whom ‘institutions’ are the 
equilibrium behaviour that derives from a specific game structure (of which rules are in turn only one 
sub-component). Instead of only focusing on rules. Greif therefore defines ‘institutions’ as ‘a system 
of social factors that conjointly generate a regularity of behaviour’ (in Greif 2006, 30).
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turn, defines ‘rules’ as ‘the set of instructions for creating an action situation in a 
particular environment’ (2005, 17). Moreover, our understanding of institutions 
puts the weight on formal constraints, that is, on the formally enacted, usually 
written rules that are expressed in legislation, administrative regulations, and 
court decisions (as Ostrom puts it in her 1990 book) rather than on other types 
of constraints – such as religious commands, social customs or moral precepts. 
Given that our main documentary evidence consists in the written regulations pro-
duced by commoners over time and enforced by local self-governing bodies, our 
stress lies more in ‘rules-in-form’ rather than ‘rules-in-use’ (Ostrom 2005). In this 
sense, we are aware that not being able to capture other types of informal rules or 
to observe actual behavior in these historical common-property regimes impairs 
our ability to fully understand the dynamics of rule innovation an institutional 
change. The limitations of historical research and the sort of empirical evidence 
historians build upon become evident here.
In front of these reservations, we still find very good reasons to study rules-in-
form. We often like to draw an analogy with a fundamental debate in the econom-
ics discipline. Despite the success of rationality assumptions to predict a great 
deal of outcomes, there still is a non-negligible gap between rational behavior (as 
predicted by economic rationality) and real behavior (as observed in behavioral 
experiments) as a consequence of the existence of cognitive biases and other fac-
tors (Simon 1983; Kahneman 2011). Rational behavior, however, still represents 
a valid benchmark against which to assess observed behavior: if we have no clear 
guidelines regarding the best an individual can do when making choices, how 
can we then assess the choice he has eventually made? We see useful parallels 
between this reasoning and the intrinsic limitations associated to the use of writ-
ten records: although it would be naïve to think that a gap between rules-in-use 
and rules-in-form did not exist, written regulations are still a very good indication 
about what the commoners deemed to be optimal in terms of exploitation and 
management given their individual interests and the distribution of bargaining 
power within the community. In that sense, our research on the process of rule 
innovation could be better read as a investigation of how benchmarks about the 
optimal activity of common-property regimes evolved over the long run.
A second point of caution relates to our definition of institutional success. 
How success is defined within the context of institutions for collective action has 
been subjected to considerable discussion and it is not our intention to directly 
engage in this debate here (Conley and Moote 2003; Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; 
Pagdee et al. 2006; Hajjar et al. 2016). All the case studies included in our analy-
sis share a common feature: their longevity. They all were in place for several 
hundreds of years. Their degree of resilience was therefore considerably high. 
Focusing on institutional longevity as a measure of institutional success has 
however received criticisms from a number of authors (Ogilvie 2007; Ogilvie 
and Carus 2014). After all, the survival of institutions throughout time could be 
largely explained by distributional considerations – with the group of individuals 
interested in the perpetuation of an inefficient institution holding a share of bar-
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gaining power considerably higher than the rest (Acemoglu et al. 2005; Ogilvie 
and Carus 2014). Beyond longevity, however, the commons analyzed in the proj-
ect exhibited the active participation of the commoners in their management and 
governance mechanisms. Moreover, all the communities fulfilled most conditions 
of the so-called ‘productive rule evolution’ as originally formulated by Ostrom 
(2014). Most importantly, the resource basis of the communities (grasslands and 
meadows, arable land, forests) did not suffer considerable losses over time – being 
able to support the reproduction of the communities. If one of the main goals of 
historical commons was precisely to adjust exploitation levels to varying socio-
economic and environmental conditions in order to avoid the exhaustion of the 
resources, their accomplishment is evident. Taking all this together (institutional 
longevity, a high degree of participation, environmental sustainability, reproduc-
tion of the human community), we are confident that our selection of case studies 
certainly captures a set of institutions whose satisfactory (if not successful) per-
formance deserves further analysis.
4. Communities
Rather than focusing all our efforts in the study of a specific region, our inter-
est in comparative research pushed us to expand the geographical boundaries of 
our project to a European level. To these ends a set of commons located in the 
Netherlands, England and Spain for which enough historical regulations had sur-
vived was first identified.
The Dutch commons in our database date back at least to early modern times. 
Most of them were already mentioned as a common in the late Middle Ages. The 
term ‘mark’, originally indicating the boundary stones that demarcated the limits 
of the common land, eventually came to refer the institutional arrangement behind 
its management and governance (Van Weeren and De Moor 2014). Membership of 
these organizations exclusively encompassed the users of the common resources 
– basically peat as source of fuel and grass for the cattle. The prevalence of these 
corporations seems to have been particularly high in the eastern Netherlands. All 
the Dutch commons included in our analysis were located in this region, which 
restricts substantially the degree of socio-economic and environmental variation. 
During much of the pre-industrial period this region was characterized by low lev-
els of urbanization, market pressure and population density, with a landed nobil-
ity leasing out their properties to farmers fundamentally focused on subsistence 
production (Van Weeren and De Moor 2014). The assembly of the mark, com-
prising all the users and usually presided over by an elective or noble markerich-
ter, was the body in charge of discussing and passing changes in the regulations. 
Monitoring by specific members and sanctioning mechanisms were designed to 
deter free riders from breaking the rules. Dissolution of most of these commons 
during the nineteenth century was closely related to their worsening financial situ-
ation. Some cases in our selection managed however to survive the effects of the 
nineteenth century legislation.
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The earliest records of the English cases are younger than the earliest records 
of the Dutch ones. Although the oldest example dates back to 1511, the earliest 
regulations of the other cases date from the end of the sixteenth, and in most cases 
from the seventeenth century. The legal context of common land in England dif-
fered from that of most commons elsewhere in Europe in that it was privately 
owned land over which third parties had use rights. The common land of the 
English case studies had the status of ‘manorial waste’, that is, waste ground 
belonging to a manor or landed estate, ownership of which had been vested in 
the lord of the manor since 1235. Contrasting with the Dutch cases, an English 
common was therefore not an institution as such; nor was it governed by an orga-
nization specially created and solely responsible for the common. A common’s 
regulation was part of the governance of the manor to which it belonged. The 
local institution which made regulations governing the exercise of use rights over 
common land was the manorial court, a seigniorial court with a jurisdiction lim-
ited to the boundaries of the manor. Called by the lord of the manor and presided 
over by his steward, the court generally required the attendance of all tenants 
of the manor, from whom was drawn a jury who determined cases and formu-
lated rules. The rules formed a body of customary law which was particular to 
that manor – it was lex loci – and many rules related to the use and exploitation 
of commons. Most manorial courts remained active until the eighteenth century, 
some continuing to make rules into the nineteenth century, but most courts had 
ceased to meet by 1860.
The oldest preserved bodies of rules of the Spanish cases included in this 
selection (those concerning Sierra de Lokiz) date from the fourteenth century 
but most of them date from the sixteenth century (Laborda-Pemán et al. 2016). 
References in these documents to even older customs suggest that the origins 
of these commons must be dated as far back as the Middle Ages. Spanish com-
mons are different from English and Dutch commons in the sense that they were 
explicitly and legally linked to the local political organization – located within 
the boundaries of a village, subjected to exploitation by all its vecinos (inhabit-
ants enjoying political rights in the village organization) and regulated by all of 
them via their participation in the village council. All these villages are located 
in the northern region of Navarre, between the highlands of the Pyrenees and 
the lowlands of the Ebro valley – an independent kingdom until 1513 when it 
was conquered by the Crown of Castile. Despite being located relatively close 
to each other, differences between the villages in their environmental and socio-
economic conditions are significant. Relatively isolated from urbanization and 
market pressures, the mountainous communities in the valley of Roncal largely 
relied on cattle farming (sheep, goats, cows) for their subsistence (Idoate 1977; 
Caro Baroja 1995; Larrea 2005). In the villages around the city of Estella the 
climatic and environmental conditions made possible a more balanced distribu-
tion of cattle farming and grain cultivation activities (Floristán Imizcoz 1982). 
In all communities, however, commons provided grass and water for the cattle 
as well as some basic inputs for the peasant economy (e.g. wood for fuel and 
Ruling the Commons. Introducing a new methodology 537
building). From the nineteenth century onwards, villages were usually assimilated 
to municipalities. Three of the commons in the Spanish sample exhibit a more 
supra-local character – with their exploitation being shared by several villages. 
All these three intercommons were governed by juntas (boards) appointed by 
the councils of the different villages with use rights on the intercommon. For this 
study we have only taken into account the regulations approved before the end of 
the nineteenth century.
5. Regulations
Circumstances around commons changed over time, causing the need for new 
rules or for the adaptation of existing ones. Rule change however could not be 
implemented at will by those in charge of the daily management of the com-
mon. In the Dutch, Belgian and Spanish commons, when rules needed to be 
changed, this had to be done with the approval of the assembly of commoners 
or neighbors, while in England such changes were made by the seigniorial 
manor court. Although emergency meetings were foreseen in case of extraor-
dinary circumstances, general meetings of the assembly (or village council in 
the Spanish cases) were usually organized on fixed annual days. The manda-
tory attendance of all members who were entitled to vote is suggestive of the 
importance that these meetings had for the satisfactory management of the 
common – a feature shared by all the cases analyzed. Unauthorized absence at 
these meetings was punished. The criteria on which decisions were made are 
not usually made explicit in the sources. In some cases there are indications of 
a simple majority of votes being sufficient; in others unanimity seems to have 
been the general rule.
As Table 1 shows, the frequency of rule changing varies not only between 
countries but also between commons in each country. Admittedly, we cannot 
entirely rule out the possibility that a number of regulations for some commons is 
missing. However, the figures seem to suggest that commoners could have used 
one of two strategies: either they had a relatively high meeting frequency, result-
ing in only a limited number of rule changes per meeting, or they preferred to 
have a limited number of meetings, this resulting however in a considerably larger 
number of rule changes each time.
The way in which regulations were written down differed from country to 
country. The most frequent example of regulations are the lists of rules (or rule 
changes) approved by the assemblies of users or neighbors or by the manorial 
court: the ‘paine lists’ in England, the markeboeken in the Netherlands, and the 
ordenanzas in Spain. These sources exhibit a clear-cut form: they consist in a list 
of articles, each of them containing a number of prohibitions, obligations or per-
missions regarding the behavior of users, officials or authorities involved. These 
articles frequently included a penalty for non-compliance with the rule concerned. 
Next to these lists of rules, regulations could also be ‘hidden’ in the reports of 
commoners’ meetings. This is the case of the markeboeken of the Netherlands, 
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the court rolls and verdict sheets of English manorial courts, and the Libros de 
actas of the Spanish councils.4
Given the nature of the evidence, it is important to stress that the use of 
these records does not come completely free of problems. The basic limitations 
associated to this evidence are its written nature (and the subsequent inability to 
capture more informal aspects) as well as the disparate survival of the records 
throughout time – intrinsic problems of any sort of historical research. With rela-
tion to the first concern, we refer to our discussion above about the distinction 
between ‘rules-in-use’ and ‘rules-in-form’, and the still valuable insights that the 
analysis of formal regulations can provide us. With regard to the second prob-
lem, there is not much we can do but acknowledging the existence of incomplete 
written records and being cautious in our conclusions when suggesting patterns 
of rule innovation over time. The emergence and persistence of written sources 
in small communities like the ones analyzed built upon two factors: a supply of 
scribes and a demand by people able to read or, at least, interested in paying for 
those services ir order to defend their collective property rights before the courts. 
So not all the rules were written and not necessarily all the written rules were 
preserved. 
Given these evident limitations, the communities analyzed were chosen on 
the basis of the existence of sufficient archival records. Once they had been 
selected, all the regulations we could find both in archives and already published 
sources were gathered. Beyond this, it is also important to stress two points. 
First, given the antiquity of many of the records retrieved, we faced a certain 
trade-off between antiquity and completeness: the farther back in time we went, 
the more unlikely was to be able to build complete series of regulations. Second, 
the incompleteness of the regulations’ time series varies per region. The insights 
regarding the process of rule innovation we can obtain are not necessarily limited 
per se given the nature of the evidence used – but are largely dependent on the 
particular region studied.
6. Methodology
Once commons’ regulations had been collected, the next step was to classify the 
rules they contained according to a standard methodology that made possible 
subsequent comparisons both over time and across communities.5 The  process 
4 For the Dutch and English cases, these ‘hidden’ rules were identified and extracted from the min-
utes to be subsequently incorporated in our dataset. In the case of the Spanish commons, it has not 
been possible to retrieve such information– which might partly explain the referred contrast between 
the Dutch and the Spanish rules regarding the number and frequency of rule changes.
5 The regulations of the different communities included in the dataset were originally collected by 
René van Weeren and Tine de Moor (for the Dutch case studies), Angus Winchester (for the English 
ones) and José Miguel Lana-Berasain (for the Spanish ones) – either directly from the archives or 
from already published compilations. For details on the sources, see the references to the primary 
sources indicated in the reference list. 
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of codification consisted in two subsequent stages: first the development of the 
codebook and the dataset structure themselves, and then the process of data 
entry. In a series of meetings, the members of the project agreed on which 
were the main categories that the dataset should encompass. The specificities 
of the  historical documents we work with pushed us to develop a codification 
scheme  ex novo rather than relying on pre-existing contributions such as the 
ADICO syntax (Ostrom 2005). The discussions and agreements during these 
initial meetings eventually materialized into the drafting of the codebook (see 
the Appendix to this paper) and the design of the online dataset. On the data-
set structure was available, the data entry itself began. Since the regulations 
collected diverged considerably with respect to the institutional, historical and 
linguistic contexts in which they were embedded, it was agreed to distribute the 
process of data entry according to native language criteria.6 In order to reduce as 
much as possible the discrepancies, another set of meetings took place so all the 
contributors could share their concerns and agree on a common ground – which 
resulted into certain decisions on codification (as shown in the final version of 
the codebook).
In some cases, especially the oldest documents, regulations were just hand-
written by a notary in front of the commoners or the village council. In other cases, 
printed copies were produced. Usually, regulations were not drafted according to a 
standard structure. Their production by official notaries introduced however some 
regularities in the way the text was organized. The regulations usually start with 
an indication of the place and the date in which the meeting of the commoners, the 
manorial court, or the village council took place. After a preamble, the rule con-
tent itself follows. All the regulations were transcribed or copied to the database 
and translated into modern-day English. As it is easily visible in Figure 1, regula-
tions were organized in different paragraphs or chapters – with each paragraph 
usually dealing with a similar topic. These chapters correspond to what we have 
called, for the purpose of our analysis, original rules. But very often each of these 
chapters (or original rules) usually contained more than a single precept. Since 
our interest lies in the specific regulatory statements ordering behavior and their 
change over time, the focus of our classification and subsequent analysis was on 
those individual clauses and not necessarily on the more general chapters.7 For 
the purposes of the analysis, we have therefore broken each chapter or original 
6 René van Weeren and Annelies Tukker entered the Dutch regulations, Angus Winchester the 
English ones, and José Miguel Lana-Berasain, Vicente Cendrero-Almodovar, and Miguel Laborda-
Pemán the Spanish ones.
7 Attention to these individual clauses within each chapter (or ‘individual rules’ in our own terminol-
ogy) follows closely the concept of ‘institutional statement’ as defined by Ostrom and Crawford in 
Ostrom (2005). These institutional statements are defined as ‘a broad set of shared linguistic con-
straints and opportunities that prescribe, permit, or advise actions or outcomes for participants in 
an action situation’ (Ostrom 2005, 137–138). This concept puts special emphasis in the shared and 
known nature of these statements among all the participants in an action situation.
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rule down into its respective component rules – which we have called individual 
rules. Individual rules, which are the basic unit of our analysis, were entered and 
codified separately in the dataset. Hence, in the database there is usually a one-to-
many relationship between original and individual rules – with a minimum of one 
individual rule for each original rule.
Once all the individual rules had been identified and entered separately, the 
next step was to hone in onto their constituent elements in order to classify each 
of them. To the best of our knowledge, the most similar attempt of providing a 
categorization of the different components of a rule is contained in the late work 
of Ostrom and her collaborators (Ostrom 2005). In Understanding Institutional 
Diversity, the theoretical foundations of a ‘grammar of institutions’ are actually 
presented. Partly building upon this inspiration but taking especially into account 
the specificities of our historical regulations, we developed a codebook to pro-
vide a detailed classificatory framework for analysing the component parts of 
each individual rule. Exploring the links between our own codification scheme 
and the original ‘grammar of institutions’ represents a promising venue for future 
research. For each individual rule, the basic elements of our codification scheme 
correspond to these different labels:
Figure 1: Handwritten regulations of the mark Berkum, the Netherlands.
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Rule category. This label indicates whether an individual rule relates to access, 
use, governance or management. Access rules specify who is entitled to use 
the common and under which conditions; rules relating to use give permission, 
state prohibitions, or impose obligations concerning resource exploitation by the 
commoners. The codebook allows further classification of the type of resource 
regulated (animals, infrastructure, vegetation, water, etc.) as well as its loca-
tion, amount, exploitation season, and technology. Governance and management 
rules are concerned with non-exploitative activities: governance rules usually 
deal with the appointment of and the tasks of officials, while management rules 
regulate the activities of the users themselves in areas other than the exploita-
tion of communal resources. The specific areas dealt with by management or 
governance rules (finance, meetings, monitoring, etc.) can be also indicated in 
the dataset.
Rule form. This label indicates whether the content of the individual rule is for-
mulated as a permission, an obligation, a prohibition or, alternatively, contains an 
appointment.
Rule sequence. This category specifically relates to the process of rule innovation 
in a common. When passing new regulations, commoners could simply decide 
to repeat an individual rule that had been already formulated without introducing 
substantial changes or, more frequently, to adjust some of its features in the light 
of changing circumstances. In the case of rules introduced ex novo without any 
recorded precedent, institutional innovation is even more evident. Finally, com-
moners might agree explicitly to cancel rules made in earlier times. Under this 
label, all these possibilities are recorded in the dataset.
Rule party. This label indicates whether the content of the rule is aimed at every-
one, at people other than commoners, or exclusively at commoners themselves. 
In the latter two cases, our codebook also allows for a more detailed delimitation 
of the rule recipient, e.g. a specific group or individual, or a specific official or 
position within the organization.
A large number of individual rules contains some kind of sanction. This is 
usually the case for rules formulated as prohibitions or obligations. As with the 
relationship between original and individual rules, some individual rules contains 
more than a single sanction. In these cases, sanctions were identified and coded 
separately. As with the individual rules, a number of elements can be identified for 
each of the sanctions. These elements are:
Offending and suffering parties. These categories identify respectively the par-
ties who commit the offence (non-members, members, officials, any person) and 
those who suffer most from it (the whole community, a group of individuals, a 
single person, or specific authorities).
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Graduated sanction. This category explicitly captures the existence of graduated 
sanctioning in robust institutions for collective action, a feature originally identi-
fied as significant by Ostrom in 1990. According to her, in resilient institutions 
for collective action rule breaking is not unavoidably subjected to harsh and fixed 
punishment. In order to accommodate the possibility of commoners’ mistakes or 
situations of pressing need, sanctioning would usually follow a graduated scheme 
with first infractions of a rule being subjected to relatively mild treatment but 
recidivism being eventually punished with exclusion from the community. Our 
coding scheme makes possible to indicate whether such a graduated scheme is 
foreseen for a specific offence, with sanctions substantially increasing after the 
first, second or third time an individual rule is broken.
Differentiated sanction. In certain cases, the sanction for the same offence was 
different depending on the timing of the infraction or the status of the offender. 
Our codebook captures this aspect by coding according to whether there is some 
time-related differentiation, since sanctions could be increased in case of offences 
committed at a specific time (e.g. at night or at a specific time of the year), or 
offender-related differentiation, whereby the severity of the sanction depended 
on the position the offender held within the community (e.g. officials might be 
punished more severely than others).
Harm type. This label identifies whether the infraction causes a direct harm to 
individuals (e.g. violence against guards), animals (e.g. contagion by infectious 
diseases) or, more often, resources (e.g. overgrazing grasslands). Additionally, it 
also makes it possible to indicate whether the offence reflects anti-social behavior, 
is a consequence of negligence and omission rather than active misbehavior, or, 
conversely, is the result a desire for unjustified profits.
Sanction type. Offences could be punished with very different types of sanctions, 
ranging from the payment of a fine (either monetary or in kind) or economic 
loss (loss of user rights, confiscation, impounding or destruction of part of the 
 offender’s assets) to political sanctions (loss of office, or exclusion from the 
assembly, the common or the village) or even social and physical ones (public 
shaming, corporal punishment). In this category, the specific type of sanction can 
be recorded. For monetary sanctions, the amount and unit of the fine can also be 
indicated.
Sanction allocation. In the case of sanctions consisting in payment of a fine, 
 regulations usually foresaw the subdivision of the revenues among different 
 parties – normally the accuser or guard on the one hand and the community 
authorities on the other, in some cases including higher levels such as the king 
or his representatives. Rewarding law-abiding commoners when they reported 
offenders was one of the ways the management of the commons sought to enhance 
monitoring by the commoners themselves. Such amounts were usually distributed 
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between the parties according to specified proportions. Both aspects (the different 
parties and their respective share) can be recorded in our dataset.
7. Dataset Overview
The total number of original rules collected from all the regulations analyzed in 
our 25 case studies is 3331. Out of all these original rules, a total of 5427 individual 
rules has been subsequently derived – from which 3280 correspond to nine Dutch 
 commons, 1684 to nine Spanish commons, and 463 to eight English commons. 
As observed, the number of English rules is relatively small (see Table 1). This 
difference is mainly due to the fact that in England only those decisions explicitly 
endorsed by the manorial court in its verdicts were subsequently recorded in the 
court rolls; there is evidence from many English manors for systems of informal 
grassroots regulation which were not recorded in writing. In the Dutch and Spanish 
cases, by contrast, no separate judicial body mediated between the process of rule 
creation and its enforcement – with the commoners’ assembly taking decisions 
autonomously and probably giving rise to a much higher recording frequency.
Access rules. As Table 2 shows, the share of rules regulating access was rela-
tively small in all the commons analyzed – independently of their geographical 
background. Although rules specifying who was entitled to use the common 
resources are likely to be among the first regulations drafted by communi-
ties, their contestation and adjustment does not seem to have taken up much 
of the effort of the commoners’ assemblies. The immediate explanation for 
this would be that access rights to the common had become relatively clear 
already in earlier times, so that repetition or adjustment were rarely necessary. 
An alternative hypothesis would suggest that, given the constitutional nature of 
access rights, their regulation was overseen by bodies other than the assembly 
of commoners itself.
A very similar situation is observed with the other type of access rules – 
those determining the geographical limits of the common-pool resource itself. 
The number of rules dealing with border conflicts is relatively small, suggest-
ing again that either the physical boundaries of the commons remained stable 
or, alternatively, that any modification was of such a foundational nature that it 
was not explicitly reflected in the documents produced by the local communi-
ties themselves. The English situation is relevant here: since common land in 
England belonged to the lord of the manor, the boundaries of the commons were 
in turn determined by the boundary of the manor. Numerous disputes between 
manors over common land boundaries are documented during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, leading to clarification of rights and clearer definition of 
boundaries. However, given their nature, these changes were recorded in other 
texts (legal degrees, charters etc.), separate from the bylaws regulating the use 
of the common.
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Use, management and governance. Remarkable differences between countries 
are visible in the preponderance of rules concerning governance and management 
(see Table 2). Whereas in the Low Countries governance was a central aspect of 
the regulations analyzed, its importance seems to have been considerably lower in 
the Spanish and English cases – although, in any case, high variation across com-
mons within each country should be noted. For their part, rules on management 
are almost absent in the English cases but are an essential part of the regulations 
of the Spanish and Dutch ones. In any case, what is evident is that most regula-
tory efforts across commons in all the three countries were focused on constantly 
adapting use rules to changing circumstances. Extractive activities and the threat 
that they could eventually represent to the community always remained the basic 
area of concern. In the English cases, over three-quarters of all the rules fall within 
this category and for the Dutch and Spanish cases they also represent a major part 
of the regulations.
Rule form. Significant differences between countries also emerge with respect to 
rule form. English rules mostly exhibit a prohibitive nature and contain hardly 
any decisions to appoint new categories of officials. Regulations of both Spanish 
and Dutch commons, on the contrary, encouraged cooperation mainly via per-
missions and obligations. Such a contrast, particularly the dissimilar importance 
of permissive rules, is likely to reflect the more top-down structure of manorial 
courts (run by the manorial authorities and with the lord’s steward controlling the 
agenda and working within a national legal framework of property rights – see 
Winchester 2015) in opposition to the more bottom-up features that characterized 
rule-making in the other two countries, where assemblies of commoners or neigh-
bors assumed the leading role.
Rule sequencing. The ability of regulations to survive over long periods of time 
is partly confirmed by figures on the sequence of rules. Particularly in the Dutch 
case studies, some rules only appear in the regulations once – never to be repeated 
or mentioned again. Although one could suggest that the clarity and the adapta-
tion of these rules to local conditions from the very beginning explain the lack 
of subsequent adjustment, it is more plausible to hypothesize however that these 
rules only applied to very specific situations or periods, after which they were no 
longer needed.
Overall, however, the small proportion of rules being spelt out for first time is 
explained by the existence of earlier regulations which have not been preserved. 
When transcribing Dutch and English regulations, it was common to indicate that 
this or that rule had its origins in an unpreserved text from an earlier date. Rule 
annulment hardly ever occurred: it is likely that regulations which fell into abey-
ance or were displaced by new ones ceased to be mentioned in subsequent regula-
tions rather than being explicitly annulled. Thus, most rules represent adjustments 
of previously formulated ones; simple repetition of an existing rule was, however, 
much less frequent.
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Sanctioning. The type of offences deserving of punishment have been analysed 
in relation to the offended party, the offender, and the sort of damage involved. 
Direct damage to resources, as well as the offender obtaining an unjustified profit, 
were the most common types of infringements across communities in the three 
countries. In most cases, the main victim of the infraction was deemed to be the 
group of commoners as a whole rather than a specific individual – an evident 
indication of the collective character of most of the resources protected by the 
regulations. Most offences were committed by commoners themselves rather than 
by people from outside the common. Although this suggests that threats to sus-
tainability fundamentally came from members’ behaviour, it should be borne in 
mind that the predominance of insiders as offenders is more likely to reflect the 
limited jurisdictional power of the community institutions whose records are the 
subject of this analysis. The fact that offences by outsiders could be subjected to 
monitoring and punishment to a much lower degree than was the case for offences 
carried out by members of the community would have translated into fewer men-
tions in the regulations.
Graduated sanctioning was only used by Dutch commoners and even there 
only to a very limited extent. There, the level of fines for a second offence was 
increased slightly in comparison with the sanction for a first-time offence. It is 
striking that the number of rules related to third-time offences is considerably 
lower – perhaps indicating that warning twice could have been sufficient in most 
cases. Much more frequent than increasing fines in cases of recidivism, was the 
differentiation of sanctions according to the time of the day or time of the year the 
offence was committed.
8. Preliminary Results
Controlling the commoners. Our dataset offers interesting insights into the 
different mechanisms designed by commoners in order to prevent free-riding 
and resource over-exploitation. Van Weeren and De Moor (2014) have ana-
lysed in detail the monitoring and punishment practices in a subset of four 
Dutch commons. Van Weeren and de Moor document in detail how common-
ers consistently resorted to monitoring by appointed officials, social control 
on the part of commoners themselves, as well as diverse punishment strate-
gies. In general, their analysis stresses two features frequently found when 
analysing historical commons: the existence of methods other than simple 
punitive strategies (even if graduated) in order to prevent free-riding as well 
as the central role performed by commoners themselves in controlling their 
fellow users’ behaviour.
In the commons analysed, specific monitoring positions were foreseen in the 
regulations with a division of tasks between those officials in charge of enforcing 
the rules and imposing fines, and those responsible for executing them. Members 
were usually appointed for one year and they were obliged to accept the appoint-
ment under the threat of a penalty for refusal. In order to compensate for under-
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taking a rather unpopular job, monitors were not only frequently remunerated but 
they were also entitled to a share of any fines imposed. Surveillance and detection 
of infringements could also build upon more informal mechanisms – the mutual 
control inevitably deployed by commoners in the performance of their daily activ-
ities, as well as the supplementary monitoring often foreseen in the regulations. 
In this respect, the effectiveness of the regulations largely relied on the activities 
of commoners themselves. Their intervention was not only explicitly foreseen 
when officials were negligent in the fulfillment of their duties but also explicitly 
encouraged as an additional monitoring mechanism – with a share of the penalties 
levied being used as incentive. The commoners’ responsibilities even reached the 
point of being subjected to punishment when they did not report offences they had 
observed. Actually, these ‘liability clauses’ are common in all the regulations ana-
lysed. Punishment was actually the last method to which users resorted in order to 
control the resource’s exploitation levels.
Several interesting insights are worth mentioning at this respect. First, the 
specification of the fine levels probably responded more to trial-and-error pro-
cesses than to once-for-all designs – with the subsequent adjustment of fine levels 
reflecting changing circumstances.
Second, graduated sanctioning seems to have had a very limited role in disci-
plining commoners’ behaviour: <2% of the 1137 individual rules analyzed con-
tain graduated sanctions (see also Table 3). This demonstrates probably that the 
use of graduated sanctions was really a last resort for commoners to enforce the 
rules, in particular vis-à-vis recidivists. It suggests that the presence of graduated 
sanctions may, instead of being a sign of resilience and robustness, rather be an 
indicator of the weaknesses of other mechanisms to prevent freeriding.
Third, differentiation of the fine levels according to membership was however 
much more decisive in determining the level of the penalty. Offences committed 
by officials were subjected to a harsher treatment than when the infractor was 
a simple commoner – a differentiation explained by the more fundamental role 
that officials had in guaranteeing the sustainability of the commons as a gover-
nance regime. Similarly, the lower probability of being caught when committing 
an offence at night (e.g. digging peat beyond the authorized limits) explains the 
need to raise fine levels in order to discourage potential offenders. In any case, the 
punishment of those breaking the rules did not come without problems. Several 
regulations show how officials in charge of fine collection often overlooked other 
commoners’ fines. When fines were actually imposed, problems in paying them 
are also frequently documented – which often led to constant  re-arrangements and 
in some cases to final bankruptcy.
Longevity, sanctioning and participation. Widening the geographical scope of the 
analysis up to eight Dutch commons, De Moor and Tukker (2015) have suggested 
a number of interesting hypotheses about the relationship between the longevity of 
institutions for collective action the level of sanctioning, and the degree of common-
ers’ involvement in the drafting of new regulations. The main hypothesis put forward 
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by the authors is that the longevity of commons exhibits a negative relationship with 
the amount of effort devoted by commoners to design and enforce sanctions, but a 
positive one with the degree of involvement. Long-standing commons would not 
be characterized by a highly repressive apparatus able to completely deter or pun-
ish free-riding, but by a participatory regime in which commoners came together 
relatively often to adjust rules to changing circumstances. Information exchange, 
mutual monitoring, and internalization of norms are probably more effective in 
explaining success than plain sanctioning. The analysis of the rules of Dutch com-
mons indeed demonstrates that the longer living commons were the ones that had 
the least number of rules that included also a sanction. Commons that were shorter 
lived had spent far more effort in designing sanctions to go with the rules.
This analysis points to a number of features that seem to have systematically 
characterized the institutional design of Dutch marken. First of all, when observ-
ing the years for which commons’ regulations are available, it becomes clear that 
long-enduring commons usually changed their regulations more incrementally: 
their commoners used to meet more frequently to make just a few number of adjust-
ments. By contrast, few but more substantial changes are observed in more short-
lived commons. Second, around half of rules across all the commons analysed dealt 
with issues of use with smaller proportions being concerned with governance and 
management aspects. Third, most rules did not have any sanction attached to them 
– with an even higher share of rules without explicit sanctioning among those com-
mons which managed to survive over a longer period. Fourth, around half of the 
changes in the regulations analyzed consisted of adjustments of previously formu-
lated rules – probably an indication that commoners were constantly taking into 
account in the regulation of the collective resources the internal and external cir-
cumstances. Simple rule repetition was, by contrast, much less important. However, 
the longer a common survived, the smaller the significance of rule repetition in the 
whole process of rule change seems to have been – which again is suggestive of the 
importance that members’ involvement and rule internalization could have had in 
more successful commons. Taking them together, all these insights allow de Moor 
Table 3: Percentage of Individual Rules without Sanction and Longevity in Dutch Commons.
Netherlands  Without sanction  With sanction  Years of survival
Berkum  70  30  695
Rozengaarde  67  33  442
Raalterwoold  66  34  395
Bestmen  51  49  395
Geesteren-Mander-Vasse  60  40  349
Coevorden  69  31  315
Dunsborger-Hattemer  52  48  297
Exel  48  52  236
Average all  62  38  390
Note: For more details and additional tables, see De Moor and Tukker 2015.
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and Tukker to put forward their hypothesis regarding sanctioning, member involve-
ment in rule-making, and longevity of the commons – a preliminary statement that, 
given the small number of commons analysed and the limitations associated with 
historical records, remains to be further validated by subsequent research.
Emergence and change of commons as governance regime. Focusing on the 
Spanish regulations, Laborda et al. (2016) study how institutional change took 
place in the commons over the long run. In their paper, institutional change 
not only encompass the frequent adjustment of the regulations once these were 
already in place but also the initial formalization of the commons themselves.
These authors analyse a number of communities located in northern Spain 
where collective exploitation of resources was already documented in late medieval 
times. Despite important differences in their geographical and climatic conditions, 
from the beginning of their existence as human settlements these communities were 
forced to develop some kind of coordination both among their members and among 
themselves. The mixed farming system that, with varying degrees of intensity, was 
at the basis of their livelihood was associated with a number of problems (cattle 
trespassing into cultivated fields, overgrazing of common grasslands) whose miti-
gation necessarily involved cooperation between neighbours and communities.
As the authors document, the formalization of these communal arrangements 
coincided with the phase of demographic expansion experienced by the region dur-
ing pre-Black Death times (13th and early 14th centuries). The informal customs 
that governed resource exploitation until then probably started to reveal themselves 
inadequate to deal with increasing pressure on grasslands and water reservoirs. 
References to conflicts and violence are common in the sources from these centu-
ries. In face of this situation, historical evidence points to a process of bottom-up 
institutional building through which neighbours and communities reached a number 
of compromises aimed at alleviating conflict and providing order in the exploitation 
of resources. The relative weakness that lordships exhibited in the region as well as 
the small size of the communities involved must have helped in the development 
of these self-governed arrangements. But particularly important in preserving self-
governance was the role played by the Crown itself. On the one hand, the location 
of these communities close to a political frontier during most pre-industrial times 
probably gave them a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the king. Similarly, the 
budget restrictions often faced by the royal treasury contributed to the delegation 
of jurisdictional powers to lower levels. On the other, the royal interest in main-
taining a prosperous and stable  frontier prevented conflicts between communities 
from escalating and threatening the survival of the arrangements. At this respect, 
the role played by the royal courts as guarantors of the stability and permanence of 
the collective arrangements was particularly relevant – supplementing the conflict-
settlement mechanisms found at the level of the communities themselves.
The clear delimitation of boundary rules (i.e. the demarcation of the resources 
and the definition of membership), as reflected in the foundational documents of 
these arrangements, gave way to other concerns with the passage of time. In this 
sense, the adjustment of rules exhibits important similarities across communities. 
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Although minor changes in membership criteria and the boundaries of the common 
resources are still visible once the formal governance arrangements had been estab-
lished, commoners were largely concerned with the direct regulation of the exploit-
ative activities. Rules governing use never represented less than half of the recorded 
rule changes. A great deal of commoners’ efforts focused on the adjustment of the 
rules on stinting, quotas, or cattle entry to and exit from the common resource, to 
varying circumstances. Operational concerns, however, never exhausted the regula-
tory concerns of the communities. Attention to the collective-choice arrangements 
through which operational rules were discussed, to the monitoring mechanisms 
behind rule compliance, and to conflict-settlement bodies are widespread. Two spe-
cific issues constantly reappear in the sources – both of them clearly pointing at the 
significance that communities attached to active member involvement in political 
and managerial affairs. One is the regulation of attendance and conduct at the com-
munity meetings; the other, the appointment of officials and the rotating nature of 
these positions. That a tension existed between neighbours’ indifference and the 
interest of the community as a whole surfaces in the establishment of penalties in 
case of non-attendance to a meeting or non-acceptance of an appointment.
9. Concluding Remarks
Attention to the emergence and change in commons in the long run unavoidably 
calls for historians and their tools to join other social scientists in their analysis of 
resilient collective action. Characterized by their stress on developments over the 
very long run, the analysis of primary sources, and their attention to the overall 
context in which individuals interact, we think that historians are well equipped to 
expand our knowledge on how institutions for collective action emerge and evolve 
throughout time. Rather than confinement within the boundaries of our respective 
disciplines, interaction between us is necessary if we want to fully understand these 
processes. Building upon theories from the social sciences but also from biology or 
physics, commons’ scholars have sketched over the last decades a novel analytical 
framework – with the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework prob-
ably being the most salient example of this. In their recent quest for reassessing 
commons and other institutions for collective action in pre-industrial Europe, his-
torians have gathered a great deal of primary evidence on the long-term evolution 
of these arrangements. By bringing these theories, methods and evidence together, 
our intention is to suggest new directions for research on the long-term evolution 
of commons with the expectation that other scholars will follow.
Rather than a self-contained showcase of finished work, this paper represents 
an invitation to other scholars interested in commons to join our efforts – an invi-
tation particularly aimed at our fellow historians. As this paper argues, historical 
regulations are a very valuable source of information to unveil the evolution of 
commons over time – a still under-explored area within the commons discipline. 
By developing and implementing our novel methodology, our conviction is that 
one more step has been taken in that direction. We are thrilled to welcome other 
colleagues in this endeavor.
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Appendix 
Codebook and user manual Database commons
Version 5.1 (Contributor version) 
Introduction
About the Codebook
This is the Contributor version of the codebook, containing all the required 
descriptions of fields used by, or useful for contributors of new data to the original 
database. Next to this version, versions 5.0 (Full version) and 5.2 (View-only ver-
sion) have been created, respectively for the database developers and guests who 
only want to look at the database without contributing data.
Purpose of the database
The database CommonsDB is a result of the research activities related to the proj-
ects ‘Data Infrastructures for the Study of Guilds and Other Forms of Collective 
Action’ (completed ultimo 2011) the ERC-funded project ‘“United We Stand”. 
The Dynamics and Consequences of Institutions for Collective Action in Pre-
Industrial Europe’’, and the NWO-funded project ‘Common Rules’.
The database is created to enter, store, and analyze data on commons through-
out Europe. We focus on two kinds of data:
 – general data on the commons (name, location, population, natural envi-
ronment, et cetera). These data are being gathered from a wide range of 
sources, such as compendiums, atlases, archival documents, et cetera. 
 – data on the regulation of these commons. These data come from either 
original archival sources (such as the markeboeken for the Dutch com-
mons) or from transcribed sources (either in hard copy or in digital form).
Way of handling data
The general data on the commons – entered in the Main Table Commons – had 
already been transferred integrally from the original dataset. These data have been 
collected and entered previously.
Regarding the data on regulation, data will be entered in various consecutive 
steps:
 – selecting text containing common rules from the original source 
 – transferring the selected original, separate rules from the original or tran-
scribed source into the dataset (Original Rules)
 – translating the text Original Rules into modern-day English
Ruling the Commons. Introducing a new methodology 559
After these initial preparatory steps, the first steps of the analysis process begin.
 – in case the Original Rule contains various separate rules, copy the text (in 
case the form has not copied it for you) of the Original Rule to the Indi-
vidual Rule (Note: in case the Original Rule contains only one single rule, 
the Individual Rule will be equal to the Original Rule (one-on-one-rela-
tionship); in the other cases, the Original Rule and the Individual Rules 
have a one-to-many-relationship).
 – in the next step, the Individual Rule will be ‘dissected’, coding the various 
individual elements of the rule (resource concerned, nature of the rule, et 
cetera).
 – each Individual Rule may contain either a) no sanctions, b) one sanction, 
or c) several sanctions for breaking the Individual Rule concerned; subse-
quently, the relationship between Individual Rule and Sanctioning General 
therefore is a) null, b) one-to-one, c) one-to-many). The sanctioning and 
their characteristics (nature, amount of fine, status of offenders, et cetera) 
are being registered in three separate tables. One General Sanction may 
contain a) one specific type of sanctioning, or b) several specific types of 
sanctioning. Therefore, the relationship between Sanctioning General and 
Sanctioning Specific is a) one-to-one, b) one-to-many. The specific types 
of sanctioning may contain either a) no subdivision, b) one subdivision, or 
c) several subdivisions. Therefore, the relationship between Sanctioning 
Specific and Subdivision is a) null, b) one-to-one, c) one-to-many).
Structure of the database
Based upon the structure of the data found so far, the database has been designed 
by creating 6 main tables and numerous subtables. The database has been designed 
in a way that the main tables contain unique information per record, whereas the 
subtables are being used as reference lists (drop-down-lists) for the main tables; 
the subtables also are being used to code the entered data simultaneously at entry. 
For schematic overview see Appendix A.
The names of the tables in the set refer to the assigned role they have. The 
system is as follows:
Main tables: Main Table, followed by the item the table deals with (Commons, 
Original Rules, Individual Rules, Sanctioning (general), Sanctioning (specific), 
and Subdivision).
Subtables: Subt, followed by a space, followed by the character(s) defining 
the related main table (C=Commons, Ir=IndividualRules, Sc=Sanctioning), fol-
lowed by an underscore and a description of the item the subtable contains. For an 
overview of the current tables, see Appendix B.
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Description of the values used
Fields are underlined and put in italics
Variables and values are bold and in italics
General
Other: is to be used when no suitable value is available.
Unspecified: is to be used when no (further) specification is given.
_Main_table_IndividualRules
Rule Category
Access  Regulations specifying who was entitled to use the marke, either implicitly 
or explicitly excluding all other persons.
  Regulations specifying the conditions for being admitted as entitled user.
  Regulations forcing those not entitled to correct their unjustified use (e.g., 
the obligation to remove their animals from the lands of the marke).
  Regulations prohibiting the use of resources by non-members who are using 
‘strawmen’.
  Regulations prescribing former members to leave the marke or the common 
land.
  Regulations prohibiting non-members to gain any profit from resources 
of the marke (e.e., the prohibition to export any resource or to sale these 
resources outside of the marke).
Use  Regulations prohibiting specific use or action to all, regardless whether 
being a member or not.
  Regulations providing specifications on the way to use resources to those 
being entitled to use these resources.
  Regulations prescribing obligations concerning physical action (e.g., 
maintenance of drainage system, maintaining fields properly, coevring up 
lands).
  Regulations granting permission to specified members.
Management  Regulations granting general management permissions to the benefit of  
the members as a whole (e.g., the permission to sell land to the benefit  
of the marke).
  Regulations specifying obligations concerning non-physical action  
(e.g., being present at meeting, notifying superiors). 
  Regulations regarding financial obligations for members.
  Regulations based on ‘higher’ regulations, sometimes originating from 
ancient times (e.g., exemption from taxes for ‘havezaten’).
  Regulations about procedures of meetings.
Governance structure  Regulations with a direct link to the management structure of the marke 
(e.g., the frequency of meetings, the way regulations were notified to the 
public).
  Regulations determining who should execute sanctions and/or in which way.
  Regulations regarding appointment of officials.
  Regulations specifying the tasks of officials within the marke.
  Regulations regarding the authorization of officials to act on behalf of the 
marke.
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Rule Form
Permission*  Regulations granting permission to use (resources of) the common in 
general or to specific (group of) members.
  Regulations granting permission to specific members (e.g., to stay at 
their farm on the common).
  Regulations granting access and/or use to persons.
 * If the rule is linguistically constructed as a permission, but has a 
sanctioning rule attached to it, then it is an obligation or a prohibition, 
and should be coded accordingly.
 * If the permission is dependent on specific conditions (but without 
a sanctioning rules) these conditions are to be entered into Rule 
Primary Condition, Rule Secondary Condition, and Rule Tertiary 
Condition.
Obligation  Regulations concerning the obligation of members regarding use of 
the common.
  Regulations concerning the obligations required for gaining access or 
obtaining membership.
  Regulations regarding the required tasks of officials.
  Regulations regarding required actions from either specified or 
unspecified persons.
Prohibition  Regulations forbidding access or use to either specified or unspecified 
persons.
  Regulations prohibiting certain actions for a specific period and/
or a specific location (e.g., prohibition to graze animals on the 
common during part of the season; in case this has been mentioned 
as: it is permitted to graze for a certain period, enter the option as 
permission!). 
  Regulations defining actions not to be allowed to specified or 
unspecified persons.
Appointment  Regulations regarding merely the appointment of officials; 
regulations regarding their tasks should be entered either as 
obligation or prohibition, depending on the content and nature of the 
regulation. 
Rejection  Only to be used in case propositions that had been made, were 
rejected by the decision makers. 
General  All regulations that could not be categorized within the categories 
mentioned above. 
Rule Sequence
Adjustment  Regulations regarding changes to an earlier rule. 
Annulation  Regulations that were set at a certain time that are cancelled.
First mentioning  First regulation about a specific topic. If there is already a rule about 
this topic, the rule is an adjustment. 
(Clarification: the first rule about keeping cows on the common is a 
first mentioning, subsequent rules that may be for different users, 
bulls, specific locations etc. are considered as adjustment.
Repetition  Regulations that are repeated at a later date than the original 
regulation, without any adjustments.
Singular mentioning  Regulations that are only mentioned a single time within the set of 
regulations for a common.
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Use General
Animals  Regulations about animals.
Borders  Regulations about the borders of the common.
Housing  Regulations about housing on the common.
Infrastructure  Regulations on infrastructure on the common.
Topsoil Resources  Regulations on topsoil resources.
Subsoil Resources  Regulations on subsoil resources.
Vegetation  Regulations regarding vegetation.
Water  Regulations regarding use of water.
Use Specific
Animals - Bees  Regulations on keeping bee(hives) on the common.
Animals - Cows  Regulations regarding cattle (including cows, calves and bulls).
Animals - Fish  Regulations on fishing.
Animals - Geese  Regulations regarding geese (including ganders and goslings).
Animals - Goats  Regulations concerning goats (including billy goats).
Animals - Horses  Regulations on horses (including mares, stallions and foals).
Animals - Mules  Regulations on mules.
Animals - Oxen  Regulations concerning oxen.
Animals - Pigs  Regulations on pigs (including sows, piglets and boars).
Animals - Sheep  Regulations on sheep (including lambs and rams).
Borders - Conflicts  Regulations on border conflicts.
Borders - Fences  Regulations on (setting and maintaining) fences.
Borders - Right of Way  Regulations specifying the right of way.
Borders - Setting of Borders  Regulations on setting borders (for instance setting border 
markers, or specifying the exact borders of the common in the 
regulations).
Housing - Cabins  Regulations on cabins and cottages (on the common).
Housing - General  General Regulations on housing.
Housing - Manors  Regulations on manors.
Housing - Manorial Farms  Regulations on manorial farms.
Housing - Peasant Farms  Regulations on peasant farms.
Infrastructure - Bridges  Regulations on (maintaining) bridges.
Infrastructure - Culverts and 
Sluices (Drainage)
 Regulations on (maintaining) culverts and sluices.
Infrastructure - Ditches 
(Drainage)
 Regulations on (maintaining) ditches.
Infrastructure - Dykes  Regulations on (maintaining) dykes.
Infrastructure - General  General regulations on infrastructure.
Infrastructure - Leat (Drainage) Regulations on (maintaining) the leat.
Infrastructure - Roads  Regulations on (maintaining) roads.
Infrastructure - Waterways 
(Drainage) General
 Regulations on (maintaining) waterways.
Subsoil - Clay  Regulations on (collecting) clay.
Subsoil - Dredgings  Regulations on (collecting) dredgings.
Subsoil - Fossile Trees  Regulations on (digging up) fossile trees.
Subsoil - Loam  Regulations on (collecting) loam.
Subsoil - Peat  Regulations on (collecting) peat.
Topsoil - Diggings general  Regulations on general diggings.
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Topsoil - (Drifting) Sand  Regulations on (collecting) sand and (fighting) drifting sands.
Topsoil - Land  General regulations on common land.
Topsoil - Manure  Regulations on (collecting) manure.
Topsoil - Toppeat (schelturf)  Regulations on (collecting) toppeat.
Topsoil - Sods  Regulations on (collecting) sods.
Topsoil - Stones  Regulations on (collecting) stones.
Vegetation - Acorns  Regulations on (collecting) acorns.
Vegetation - Bracken  Regulations on (collecting) bracken.
Vegetation - Bushes  Regulations on (cutting) bushes.
Vegetation - Crops (in general)  Regulations on crops in general.
Vegetation - Forests  Regulations on forests.
Vegetation - Gorse  Regulations on (collecting) gorse.
Vegetation - Grass  Regulations on (collecting) grass.
Vegetation - Hay  Regulations on (collecting) hay.
Vegetation - Heath  Regulations on (collecting) heath.
Vegetation - Moss  Regulations on (collecting) moss.
Vegetation - Reeds  Regulations on (collecting) reeds.
Vegetation - Rushes  Regulations on (collecting) rushes.
Vegetation - Sedges  Regulations on (collecting) sedges.
Vegetation - Stalks  Regulations on (collecting) stalks.
Vegetation - Thistle  Regulations on (collecting) thistle.
Vegetation - Timber  Regulations on (collecting) timber.
Vegetation - Wood  Regulations on (collecting) wood.
Water - Drinking  Regulations on letting animals drink.
Water - Irrigation  Regulations on irrigation of soil.
Governance General
Access  Regulations regarding access.
Administration  Regulations regarding the administration of the common.
Finance  Regulations regarding financial matter.
Maintenance in general  Regulations about maintenance.
Management System  General regulations about the management system of the 
common.
Meetings and convocations Regulations about meetings of the common and regulations on 
convocation for those meetings.
Monitoring  Regulations about monitoring and sanctioning by officials and 
members.
Governance Specific
Access - Access Rights  Regulations regarding access rights (for instance who is and is not 
allowed to become a member).
Access - Admission Fee  Regulations regarding admission fees for new members.
Access - Shares  Regulations concerning (for instance: buying and selling of) shares.
Administration - Producing 
Overview
 Regulations on producing an administrative overview, for instance 
a list of all animals grazing on the common subdivided per owner.
Administration - Registration 
of Regulations
Regulations regarding the setting down and announcing of rules.
Finance - Admission Fee  Regulations regarding admission fees for new members.
Finance - Governance Fees  Regulations on payment of fees for governance.
Finance - Payment of Debts  Regulations on payment of debts by the common or to the 
common.
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Finance - Payment of Rent  Regulations on the payment of rent by the common or to the 
common.
Finance - Sale of Lands  Regulations regarding the sale of land.
Finance - Tax  Regulations regarding the payment of taxes by the common or 
through the common (i.e. not grazing fees).
Finance - Use Fee  Regulations regarding payment for use of the common (for 
instance grazing fees).
Finance - Wages Officials  Regulations regarding the payment of wages to officials (of the 
common).
Maintenance - General  Regulations concerning (performing of) maintenance.
Maintenance - Procedures  Regulations concerning the procedures of maintenance (for 
instance: convocation, gathering at a specific location and time, 
and performing maintenance as specified by an official of the 
common).
Management - Appointing 
Officials
 Regulations about the appointment of officials for the common.
Management - Jurisdiction  Regulations regarding the jurisdiction of the common.
Management - Regulations 
General
 Regulations that state that none of the regulations of the common 
may be broken, and stipulate a sanction, or regulations that state 
that all previous regulations are still in effect.
Management - General 
Tasks
 Regulations about general management tasks.
Meetings - Convocation  Regulations concerning convocation for meetings.
Meetings - Procedures  Regulations on the procedures to be followed at meetings  
(for instance: reading out of all regulations, listing all  
offences, etc.).
Meetings - Voting Rights  Regulations regarding voting rights (for instance: who has the 
right to vote, are decisions taken at a unanimous or majority vote 
etc.).
Monitoring - General  Regulations regarding general monitoring tasks (for instance: 
keep a close eye on the common, report offenders etc.).
Monitoring - Inspections  Regulations regarding inspections of the common (for instance 
inspections on waterways, counting sheep etc.).
Monitoring - Sanctioning  Regulations regarding sanctioning of offenders (for instance: who 
executes which sanctions).
Party Category
Everybody  Regulations regarding everybody, both members/right holders and 
non-members/right holders of the common.
Members/right holders  Regulations regarding members/right holders of the common.
Non-members/right 
holders
 Regulations regarding non-members/right holders of the common.
Party Subcategory
Everyone  Regulations regarding everybody, both members/right holders and 
non-members/right holders of the common.
All Members/Right holders  Regulations regarding all members/right holders of the common.
Specified Group of 
Members/Right holders
 Regulations regarding a specified group of members/right holders 
(which will be specified in Party Specific).
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Specified Members/Right 
holders
 Regulations regarding members/right holders specified by name.
Non-Members/Right 
holders, all




 Regulations regarding specific non-members/right holders of the 
common (either named or a specified group).
Officials in General  Regulations regarding officials specified by their function.
Officials, Specified by 
Person
 Regulations regarding officials specified by their function and 
their name (if specified by name and function, then specify by 
function in Party Specific).
Party Specific
Assembly of Inheritors  Regulations regarding the assembly of inheritors (hereditary 
members of the common).
Assembly of Marke  Regulations for the assembly of the marke (Dutch type of 
common).
Higher Authority  Regulations regarding a higher authority.
Bailiff  Regulations regarding the Bailiff, an English official.
Bijzitters  Regulations regarding bijzitters, persons living within a Dutch 
common without being a member.
Buyers  Regulations regarding persons who buy land or resources from 




 Regulations regarding the inhabitants of cabins and cottages 
(generally those built on common land or owned by the common).
Chairman assembly 
together w Commissioned 
Members
 Regulations regarding the chairman of the assembly of the 
common together with the commissioned members.
Citizens  Regulations regarding the citizens of a specific location.
Children  Regulations regarding children (of members/right holders or  
non-members/right holders).
Clerics  Regulations regarding clerics.
Collector Land Tax  Regulations regarding the collector of land tax.
Chairman Neighbourhood  Regulations regarding the chairman of the neighbourhood.




 Regulations regarding commissioned members/right holders, 
officials that have been appointed for a specific task.
Married Couple  Regulations regarding married couples.
Corporate Body  Regulations regarding corporate bodies (only use this general 
term if a more specific term is not possible).
Dijkgraaf  Regulations regarding the dijkgraaf, a specific official in Dutch 
commons.
Forest Keeper  Regulations regarding the forest keeper, an official of the 
common.
Farmers in General  Regulations regarding farmers (only use this general category if a 
more specific category is not applicable).
Grass Men  Regulations regarding grass men, officials of English commons.
Hoofdman  Regulations regarding the hoofdman, an official of Flemish 
commons.
Household  Regulations regarding the household.
Huisluiden  Regulations regarding huisluiden, a Dutch type of farmer.
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Inheritors  Regulations regarding inheritors, hereditary members of a Dutch 
common.
Lodgers  Regulations regarding lodgers.
Landlords  Regulations regarding landlords.
Legal Occupations  Regulations regarding persons who practice a legal occupation 
(such as lawyers etc.).
Location  Regulations regarding persons living in a specific location (for 
instance a village, city or specific part of the common).
Meentmeester  Regulations regarding the meentmeester, official of Flemish 
common.
Mayor  Regulations regarding the mayor.
Named Persons  Regulations regarding named persons (if a rule is related to 
named officials with a specified function, then fill in the function).
Neighbours  Regulations regarding neighbours.
Non-shareholder  Regulations regarding non-shareholders, persons without shares 
in the common, but with (limited) use rights.
New Members/Right 
holders
 Regulations regarding new members/right holders.
Orphans  Regulations regarding orphans.
Poor Chaser  Regulations regarding poor chasers, officials of the (Dutch) 
common that is responsible for chasing off vagrants.
Cattle Pounders (schutters) Regulations regarding cattle pounders, officials of the common 
(known as Schutters in Dutch).
Schout  Regulations regarding schout (Dutch regular official, comparable 
to English bailiff)
Scribe  Regulations regarding scribes.
Servant/Maid  Regulations regarding servants and/or maids.
Shepherds  Regulations regarding shepherds.
Shareholders  Regulations regarding shareholders, persons owning shares in the 
common.
Smallholders  Regulations regarding smallholders, persons living in a small 
house/cottage with a small plot.
Schepenen  Regulations regarding schepenen, officials of a Dutch city.
Steward  Regulations regarding stewards.
Sworn Members/Right 
holders
 Regulations regarding sworn members, officials that have been 
sworn in (especially common in Dutch commons).
Schaarzetters  Regulations regarding schaarzetters, officials in Dutch commons 
that decided how many animals could be grazed on the common.
Tenant Farmers  Regulations regarding tenant farmers.
Vroentmeester  Regulations regarding the vroentmeester, an official of Flemish 
commons.
Widow(er)s  Regulations regarding widows and/or widowers.
Sanctioning General
Liability
Yes, Active Participation with Offenders  Regulations sanctioning persons who actively assist 
offenders in free-riding.
No  Regulations without a liability component.
Yes, Otherwise  Regulations sanctioning persons liable in another 
manner.
Yes, Allowing Offenders passively  Regulations sanctioning persons who allow other 
persons to free-ride without participating.
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Party Suffering
Class of Subjects  Regulations sanctioning behaviour damaging to a class of subjects.
Community  Regulations sanctioning behaviour damaging the community (i.e. 
the members/right holders of the common) (if it is not specifically 
stated who is damaged by the offender, it may be assumed that the 
community suffers).
Higher Authority  Regulations sanctioning behaviour damaging to a higher authority.
Single Subject/Person  Regulations sanctioning behaviour damaging to a single subject or 
person.
Party Offending
The values chosen in this field should correspond to the option chosen in the Party 
fields in the Individual Rules Table.
Everybody  Sanctioning regulations regarding everybody.
Offender is non-member/right holder  Sanctioning regulations regarding non-members/right 
holders.
Offenders are group of non-members/right 
holders
 Sanctioning regulations regarding a group of non-
members/right holders.
Offenders are group of members/right 
holders
 Sanctioning regulations regarding a group of members/
right holders.
Offender is member/right holder  Sanctioning regulations regarding members/right 
holders.
Offender is official (member/right holder)  Sanctioning regulations regarding officials (it is 
assumed that officials from the common are members 
or right holders, if they are not, then specify as other).
Rule Trigger
Whenever  Sanctioning regulations that are triggered at any time, whether an 
offence is made or not.
Upon Rule Breaking Sanctioning regulations that are triggered when the rule is broken.
At Specified Time  Sanctioning regulations that are triggered at a specific, time, for 
instance at an inspection.
Graduated
1st non-compliance  Sanctioning regulations that are graduated, increasing in severity if the 
offence is committed more often. Choose this value if the sanctioning 
rule specifies that the sanction is increased after not complying with this 
first sanction.
1st Offence  Sanctioning regulations that are graduated, increasing in severity if the 
offence is committed more often. Choose this value if the sanctioning 
rule specifies that the sanction is increased after committing the crime 
again after having been punished with this first sanction.
2nd non-compliance Sanctioning regulations that are graduated, increasing in severity if the 
offence is committed more often. Choose this value if the sanctioning 
rule specifies that the sanction is increased after not complying with 
an earlier sanction (for instance, refusing to pay the fine, or resisting 
impounding of animals). 
Ruling the Commons. Introducing a new methodology 579
2nd Offence (and 
onwards)
 Sanctioning regulations that are graduated, increasing in severity if the 
offence is committed more often. Choose this value if the sanctioning 
rule specifies that the sanction is increased after committing the crime for 
a second time after having been sanctioned before.
3rd non-compliance  Sanctioning regulations that are graduated, increasing in severity if the 
offence is committed more often. Choose this value if the sanctioning 
rule specifies that the sanction is increased after not complying with two 
earlier sanction (1st non-compliance and 2nd non-compliance.
3rd Offence (and 
onwards)
 Sanctioning regulations that are graduated, increasing in severity if the 
offence is committed more often. Choose this value if the sanctioning 
rule specifies that the sanction is increased after committing the crime for 
a third time after having been sanctioned before.
Non-Graduated  Sanctioning regulations that are not graduated.
Differentiated
Member/Right holder  Sanctioning regulations that are explicitly specified as higher or lower 
when committed by a member or right holder (as opposed to another 
party).
Non-Member/Right holder Sanctioning regulations that are explicitly specified as higher or lower 
when committed by a member or right holder (as opposed to another 
party).
Non-Differentiated  Sanctioning regulations that are not graduated.
Official  Sanctioning regulations that are explicitly specified as higher or lower 
when committed by an official of the common (as opposed to another 
party).
Time (day)  Sanctioning regulations that are explicitly specified as higher or lower 
when committed at a specific time of day (for instance: at night).
Time (period)  Sanctioning regulations that are explicitly specified as higher or lower 
when committed during a specific time of year (for instance during a 
specific month, or during winter etc.).
Harm Type
Damage on Animals  Sanctions levied for offences that (explicitly) cause damage to animals 
(for instance grazing animals with an illness).
Damage through Anti-social 
Behavior
 Sanctions levied for offences that are (explicitly) anti-social. 
Damage through Negligence  Sanctions levied for damage (explicitly) caused by negligence (for 
instance failing to perform maintenance).
Damage on Persons  Sanctions levied for (explicitly) causing damage to persons (for 
instance violence).
Damage on Resources  Sanctions levied for (explicitly) causing damage to resources (for 
instance cutting up a peat road for the turf). It is often difficult to 
ascertain whether a rule is designed for sanctioning damage on 
resources or due to unjustified profits, it is not uncommon that no 
specification is given, at this point preference should be given to 
Damage through unjustified profit.
Damage through Unjustified 
profit
 Sanctions levied for causing damage (to the other members) by 
unjustly profiting from the common (for instance by grazing too many 
animals). It is often difficult to ascertain whether a rule is designed 
for sanctioning damage on resources or due to unjustified profits, it is 
not uncommon that no specification is given, at this point preference 
should be given to Damage through unjustified profit.
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Sanctioning Specific
Sanction Imposed Per General
This field is only used for specifying fines.
Offence  Basis on which the fine is levied is per offence, not taking into account how 
heavy the offence was (for instance how many animals were grazed above the 
stint).
Quantity-Amount Basis on which the fine is levied is per amount (for instance a fine must be paid 
for every animal).
Quantity-Time  Basis on which the fine is levied is per unit of time (for instance for every 
(extra) day or week that an offence is committed).
Sanction Imposed Per Specific
This field is only used for specifying fines.
Animal  The fine must be paid for every (additional)animal.
Branch  The fine must be paid for every (additional)tree branch.
Bush  The fine must be paid for every (additional)bush.
Bundle of willow shoots  The fine must be paid for every (additional)bundle of willow shoots.
Day  The fine must be paid for every (additional)day that the offence was 
committed.
Days of Work  The fine must be paid for every (additional)day of work.
Herd  The fine must be paid for every (additional)herd.
Beehive  The fine must be paid for every (additional)beehive.
Klos  The fine must be paid for every (additional)klos (Dutch unit of 
measure).
Load  The fine must be paid for every (additional)load.
Offence - Omission  The fine must be paid for every offence of omission (neglecting to 
perform a duty).
Offence - Transgression  The fine must be paid for every transgression (offending by 
breaking a prohibition).
Piece  The fine must be paid for every (additional)piece.
Rod (Roede)  The fine must be paid for every (additional)rod (unit of 
measurement).
Shoot  The fine must be paid for every (additional)shoot.
Sworn member  The fine must be paid for every (additional)sworn member (specific 
official against whom the offence is made).
Transport  The fine must be paid for every (additional)transport.




 The offence is sanctioned by the confiscation of private property 
(for instance by confiscation of the animals that were grazed without 
permission). The difference between confiscation and impounding is that 
confiscation is permanent and impounding is temporary.
Confiscation Resource 
Common
 The offence is sanctioned by the confiscation of the resources from 
the common that were stolen. The difference between confiscation 
and impounding is that confiscation is permanent and impounding is 
temporary.
Corporal Sanctioning  The offence is sanctioned by corporal punishment.
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Destruction Assets  The offence is sanctioned by the destruction of property (for instance the 
killing of the animal grazed without permission or tearing down of the 
cottage built on the common without permission).
Exclusion from 
Commoners’ Assembly
 The offence is sanctioned by exclusion from the Commoners’ Assembly 
(loss of political rights/right to vote/speak at assembly).
Exclusion from 
Common
 The offence is sanctioned by (temporary or permanent) exclusion from 
the common.
Exclusion from Village 
Council
 The offence is sanctioned by exclusion from the village council (loss of 
political rights/right to vote/speak at the council).
Impounding  The offence is sanctioned by the impounding of the offending assets (for 
instance locking up the animals, or taking away prohibited tools). The 
difference between confiscation and impounding is that confiscation is 
permanent and impounding is temporary.
Legal Action  The offence is sanctioned with legal actions taken against the offender.
Loss of Office  The offence is sanctioned by the loss of office (officials loose their 
appointment).
Loss of Use Right  The offence is sanctioned by the (temporary or permanent) loss of the 
right of using (a part or a resource from) the common. (for instance: the 
right to graze animals, the right to dig peat etc.)
Monetary Payment  The offence is sanctioned by a monetary payment (to be paid in a 
currency specified in Sanction_Unit)
Public Exposure/
Shaming
 The offence is sanctioned by public exposure and shaming of the 
offender.
Payment in Kind  The offence is sanctioned by a payment in kind (to be paid in a unit 
specified in Sanction_Unit).
Restoration  The offence is sanctioned by forcing the offender to repair the damage 
he has done.
Unspecified  The offence is sanctioned by an unspecified sanction, usually in the 
cases where the punishement is defined as ‘according to the law of the 
common (‘naar markenregte’).
Unspecified Payment  The offence is sanctioned by an unspecified fine (the fine is either 
unspecified (perhaps left to the discretion of the official), or the original 
document is damaged, wherefore it cannot be ascertained if the fine is 
monetary, or to be paid in kind).
Subdivision
Sanction Subdivision
0.125  One-eight of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
0.167  One-sixth of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
0.20  One-fifth of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
0.25  One-quarter of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_
Party.
0.33  One-third of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
0.40  Two-fifth of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
0.50  Half the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
0.66  Two-thirds of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
0.75  Three-quarters of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_
Party.
0.80  Four-fifth of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
0.83  Five-sixth of the proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
1.00  All proceeds of the sanction go the party specified in Subdivision_Party.
Not applicable The division of sanctions is not specified.
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Subdivision Party
Benefit Common  The proceeds of the sanction go to the common, to be used for the 
benefit of the common.
Chairman Assembly  The proceeds of the sanction go to the chairman of the assembly.
Higher Authority  The proceeds of the sanction go to a higher authority.
Inheritors  The proceeds of the sanction go to the inheritors (hereditary 
members of the common).
Local Government  The proceeds of the sanction go to the local government.
Persons Present at Gathering The proceeds of the sanction go to the persons present at a 
specified gathering (for instance a meeting).
Members/Right holder  The proceeds of the sanction go to the members/right holders of 
the common.
Not Applicable  No subdivision of the sanction is specified.
Neighbour  The proceeds of the sanction go to the neighbours living in the 
common.
Official  The proceeds of the sanction go to (a specified) official of the 
common.
Person Reporting Offence  The proceeds of the sanction go to the Person reporting the 
offence.
Decisions made on codifying




Permission*  * If the rule is linguistically constructed as a permission, but has a sanctioning 
rule attached to it, then it is an obligation or a prohibition, and should be coded 
accordingly.
 * If the permission is dependent on specific conditions (but without a sanctioning 
rules) these conditions are to be entered into Rule Primary Condition, Rule Secondary 
Condition, and Rule Tertiary Condition.
Prohibition  Regulations prohibiting certain actions for a specific period and/or a specific location 
(e.g., prohibition to graze animals on the common during part of the season; in case 
this has been mentioned as: it is permitted to graze for a certain period, enter the 
option as permission!). 
Rule Sequence
First mentioning  First regulation about a specific topic. If there is already a rule about this topic, the 
rule is an adjustment. 
(Clarification: the first rule about keeping cows on the common is a first 
mentioning, subsequent rules that may be for different users, bulls, specific 
locations etc. are considered as adjustment.
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Party Specific
Assessors  Regulations for the assistant of the chairman of the common. (The Dutch assessors are 
bijzitters and should be coded as such).
Buyers  Regulations regarding persons who buy land or resources from the common (only to be 
used if a more specific term is not available).
Corporate 
Body
 Regulations regarding corporate bodies (only use this general term if a more specific 
term is not possible).
Farmers in 
General
 Regulations regarding farmers (only use this general category if a more specific category 
is not applicable).
Rule Primary Condition, Rule Secondary Condition, and Rule Tertiary 
Condition
These fields may only be used when the rule is a permission.
Sanctioning General
Party Suffering
Community  Regulations sanctioning behaviour damaging the community (i.e. the members/
right holders of the common) (if it is not specifically stated who is damaged by the 
offender, it may be assumed that the community suffers).
Party Offending
The values chosen in this field should correspond to the option chosen in the Party 
fields in the Individual Rules Table.
Offender is official 
(member/right 
holder)
 Sanctioning regulations regarding officials (it is assumed that officials from the 
common are members or right holders, if they are not, then specify as other).
Harm Type
Damage on Resources  Sanctions levied for (explicitly) causing damage to resources (for instance 
cutting up a peat road for the turf). It is often difficult to ascertain whether 
a rule is designed for sanctioning damage on resources or due to unjustified 
profits, it is not uncommon that no specification is given, at this point 
preference should be given to Damage through unjustified profit.
Damage through 
Unjustified profit
 Sanctions levied for causing damage (to the other members) by unjustly 
profiting from the common (for instance by grazing too many animals). It is 
often difficult to ascertain whether a rule is designed for sanctioning damage 
on resources or due to unjustified profits, it is not uncommon that no 
specification is given, at this point preference should be given to Damage 
through unjustified profit.
584 Tine de Moor et al.
Sanctioning Specific
Sanction Imposed Per Specific
This field is only used for specifying fines.
Sanction Imposed Per General
This field is only used for specifying fines.
User manual Online Database Common Rules
General Remark 1: When changing from one Table or Overview to another, 
it may take some time to load the new Table or Overview. Please check care-
fully if the new Table or Overview already has loaded before you continue.
General Remark 2: Due to the current lay-out of the system, items may at 
first glance seem not to appear; since the lay-out exceeds the screen boundar-
ies, these items can be found by scrolling to the right.
General
1. Surf to http://www.collective-action.info/commons/menu.php
2. Log in, using you login-ID and password
3. Go to Tab Main Table Commons
4. Scroll to the common you will be working on; in case Original Rules for 
the common already have been entered, a link will show just before of the 
name of the common, indicating the number of Original Rules entered 
5. Click on the link mentioning the presence and the number of rules just 
before the name of the common; an overview of the Original Rules entered 
will unfold
To add new Individual Rules
6. Click on link ‘Proceed to Main Table Original Rules’
7. You will see an overview of the Original Rules entered for the specific 
common; in case the original Rule already has been split up into two or 
more Individual Rules, a link will appear before the ID# of the Original 
Rule, stating ‘Individual Rules’ and the number of Individual Rules 
already entered for that specific Original Rule.
8. In case Individual Rules already have been created for that specific 
Original Rule:
a. click on the link ‘Individual Rules ([number of rules entered])’
b. click on link ‘Proceed to Main Table Individual Rules’
c. you will now see an overview of the Individual Rules already entered 
for that specific Original Rule
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d. if you want to add an additional Individual Rule, click on the button 
‘Add New’
e. the entry form for a new Individual Rule will now open, the ID# of 
the Original Rule the new Individual Rule refers to, has already been 
filled in by the system
f. fill out the form, see attachment for description of fields
g. when you have filled out all required fields, press button ‘Save’
h. repeat this procedure as often as necessary
i. if you want to change to another Original Rule, press option ‘Back 
to Main Table Original Rules’
 9. In case NO Individual Rules have been created for that specific Original 
Rule:
a. remember the name of the common and the ID# of the Original Rule 
concerned
b. click on tab ‘Main Table Individual Rules’
c. if you want to add an additional Individual Rule, click on the button 
‘Add New’
d. first, select the name of the common concerned
e. next, select the Original Rule the new Individual Rule refers to (the 
form will only show the Original Rules belonging to that specific 
common)
f. fill out the form, see attachment for description of fields
g. when you have filled out all required fields, press button ‘Save’
h. repeat this procedure as often as necessary
i. if you want to change to another Original Rule, press option ‘Back to 
Main Table Original Rules’
To add new Sanctioning General
10. Click on link ‘Proceed to Main Table Individual Rules’
11. You will see an overview of the Individual Rules entered for the spe-
cific Original Rules; in case the Individual Rules already has been linked 
to one or more Sanctioning General, a link will appear before the ID# 
of the Individual Rule, stating ‘Sanctioning General’ and the number of 
Sanctionings General already entered for that specific Individual Rule.
12. In case Sanctionings General already have been created for that specific 
Individual Rule:
a. click on the link ‘Sanctioning General ([number of sanctionings 
entered])’
b. click on link ‘Proceed to Main Table Sanctioning General’
c. you will now see an overview of the Sanctionings General already 
entered for that specific Individual Rule
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d. if you want to add an additional Sanctioning General, click on the 
button ‘Add New’
e. the entry form for a new Sanctioning General will now open, the ID# 
of the Individual Rule the new Sanctioning General refers to, has 
already been filled in by the system
f. fill out the form, see attachment for description of fields
g. when you have filled out all required fields, press button ‘Save’
h. repeat this procedure as often as necessary
i. if you want to change to another Individual or Original Rule, press 
option ‘Back to Main Table Individual Rules’ or ‘Back to Main Table 
Original Rules’
13. In case NO Sanctionings General have been created for that specific 
Individual Rule:
a. remember the name of the common and the ID# of the Individual 
Rule concerned
b. click on tab ‘Main Table Sanctioning General’
c. if you want to add an additional Sanctioning General, click on the 
button ‘Add New’
d. first, select the name of the common concerned
e. next, select the Individual Rule the new Sanctioning General refers 
to (the form will only show the Individual Rules belonging to that 
specific common)
f. fill out the form, see attachment for description of fields
g. when you have filled out all required fields, press button ‘Save’
h. repeat this procedure as often as necessary
i. if you want to change to another Individual Rule, press option ‘Back 
to Main Table Individual Rules’
To add new Sanctioning Specific
14. Click on link ‘Proceed to Main Table Sanctioning General’
15. You will see an overview of the Sanctionings General entered for the spe-
cific Individual Rule; in case the Sanctioning General already has been 
linked to one or more Sanctionings Specific, a link will appear before 
the ID# of the Sanctioning General, stating ‘Sanctioning Specific’ and 
the number of Sanctionings Specific already entered for that specific 
Sanctioning General.
16. In case Sanctionings Specific already have been created for that specific 
Sanctioning General:
a. click on the link ‘Sanctioning Specific ([number of sanctionings entered])’
b. click on link ‘Proceed to Main Table Sanctioning Specific’
c. you will now see an overview of the Sanctionings Specific already 
entered for that specific Sanctioning General
Ruling the Commons. Introducing a new methodology 587
d. if you want to add an additional Sanctioning Specific, click on the 
button ‘Add New’
e. the entry form for a new Sanctioning Specific will now open, the ID# 
of the Sanctioning General the new Sanctioning Specific refers to, has 
already been filled in by the system
f. fill out the form, see attachment for description of fields
g. when you have filled out all required fields, press button ‘Save’
h. repeat this procedure as often as necessary
i. if you want to change to another Sanction General, press option ‘Back 
to Main Table Sanctioning General’
17. In case NO Sanctionings Specific have been created for that specific 
Sanctioning General:
a. remember the ID# of the Sanctioning General and the ID# of the 
Indiviual Rule concerned
b. click on tab ‘Main table Sanctioning Specific’
c. if you want to add an additional Sanctioning Specific, click on the 
button ‘Add New’
d. first, select the name of the common concerned
e. next, select the Individual Rule the Sanctioning Specific refers to (the 
form will only show the Original Rules belonging to that specific 
common)
f. next, select the ID# of the Sanctioning General the Sanctioning 
Specific refers to 
g. fill out the form, see attachment for description of fields
h. when you have filled out all required fields, press button ‘Save’
i. repeat this procedure as often as necessary
j. if you want to change to another Sanctioning General, press option 
‘Back to Main Table Sanctioning General’
To add new Subdivision
18. Click on link ‘Proceed to Main Table Sanctioning Specific’
19. You will see an overview of the Sanctionings Specific entered for the 
specific Sanctioning General; in case the Sanctioning Specific already 
has been linked to one or more Subdivisions, a link will appear before the 
ID# of the Sanctioning Specific, stating ‘Subdivision’ and the number of 
Subdivisions already entered for that specific Sanctioning Specific.
20. In case Subdivisions already have been created for that specific 
Sanctioning Specific:
a. click on the link ‘Subdivision ([number of Subdivisions entered])’
b. click on link ‘Proceed to Main Table Subdivisions’
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c. you will now see an overview of the Subdivisions already entered for 
that specific Sanctioning Specific
d. if you want to add an additional Subdivision, click on the button 
‘Add New’
e. the entry form for a new Subdivisions will now open, the ID# of the 
Sanctioning Specific the new Subdivision refers to, has already been 
filled in by the system
f. fill out the form, see attachment for description of fields
g. when you have filled out all required fields, press button ‘Save’
h. repeat this procedure as often as necessary
i. if you want to change to another Sanction Specific, press option 
‘Back to Main Table Sanctioning Specific’
21. In case NO Subdivisions have been created for that specific Sanctioning 
Specific:
a. remember the common, the ID#s of the Individual Rule, of the 
Sanctining General, and of the Sanctioning Specific concerned
b. click on tab ‘Main Table Subdivision’
c. if you want to add an additional Subdivision, click on the button ‘Add 
New’
d. first, select the name of the common concerned
e. next, select the Individual Rule the new Subdivision refers to (the 
form will only show the Original Rules belonging to that specific 
common)
f. next, select the ID# of the Sanctioning General the Subdivision 
refers to 
g. next, select the ID# of the Sanctioning Specific the Subdivision 
refers to 
h. fill out the form, see attachment for description of fields
i. when you have filled out all required fields, press button ‘Save’
j. repeat this procedure as often as necessary
k. if you want to change to another Sanctioning General, press option 
‘Back to Main Table Sanctioning General’
